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AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL FICTION: THE
FELONY-MURDER RULE AS APPLIED TO THE
SUPPLY OF DRUGS
James Wong and Kent Louie were looking for a good time in
Chinatown, and around nine o'clock they got lucky. Two young women
agreed to join them. The women, however, wanted some heroin first,
so they gave their new companions money and asked them to purchase
the drug. After the men obliged, both women injected themselves,
and everyone proceeded to a hotel. The next morning, only one of
the women woke up. James and Kent, it turned out, had really not
been lucky at all; both were tried, convicted and sentenced for felony-
murder.'
Although the men probably did not know it, their case was not
that unusual. Six jurisdictions have held that a person is a murderer
if he supplies illegal drugs to another person who later dies of an
overdose.2 Five of the six have relied on the traditional felony-murder
People v. Wong, 35 Cal. App. 3d 812, 111 Cal. Rptr. 314 (1973).
2 See People v. Poindexter, 51 Cal. 2d 142, 330 P.2d 763 (1958) (conviction of
second degree murder affirmed where defendant sold heroin to deceased); Martin v.
State, 377 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 1979) (conviction of first degree murder affirmed where
defendant sold heroin to deceased through intermediary); State v. Forsman, 260
N.W.2d 160 (Minn. 1977) (conviction of third degree murder affirmed where defend-
ant sold deceased heroin and thereafter injected him); Sheriff of Clark County v.
Morris, 99 Nev. 109, 659 P.2d 852 (1983) (had indictment alleged facts regarding
defendant's conduct or presence during defendant's ingestion of the drug, second
degree murder would have lain for defendant's sale of chloral hydrate to deceased);
State v. Randolph, 676 S.W.2d 943 (Tenn. 1984) (reversed the dismissal of second
degree murder charges against three defendants in the line of sale of heroin to de-
ceased); Heacock v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 397, 323 S.E.2d 90 (1984) (conviction
of second degree murder affirmed where defendant supplied cocaine to deceased).
These six states (California, Florida, Minnesota, Nevada, Tennessee, and Virginia)
are among only eight jurisdictions in which felony-murder prosecutions have arisen
based on the drug supplier-overdose pattern. The two states that have refused to
impose such liability are Arizona and Kansas. See State v. Dixon, 109 Ariz. 441,
511 P.2d 623 (1973) (on certified question, court held that second degree felony-
murder would not lie against a seller of heroin where a purchaser voluntarily and
out of the presence of the seller took an overdose); State v. Mauldin, 215 Kan. 956,
529 P.2d 124 (1974) (dismissal of murder charge affirmed; charge was based on
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rule, holding that supplying drugs is a felony and the overdose is
caused by the commission of that felony.3 The sixth jurisdiction has
adopted a statutory variation of the felony-murder rule which is ad-
dressed specifically to drug suppliers. 4
This Note will establish why such applications of the felony-murder
rule are contrary to longstanding legal and constitutional principles.
defendant's sale of heroin to the deceased).
There is little reason to believe, however, that this type of liability will remain
limited to those states that have adopted it thus far. Five states have already adopted
statutes which are expressly directed at drug suppliers. See infra note 21. Interestingly,
one of the states is Arizona, whose legislature apparently acted in response to the
Dixon court's refusal to apply the felony-murder rule.
Moreover, there have been several manslaughter convictions in other jurisdictions
based on factual situations nearly identical to the felony-murder cases. See People
v. Hopkins, 101 Cal. App. 2d 704, 226 P.2d 74 (1951) (manslaughter charge reinstated
where defendant furnished heroin bought with deceased's money); Silver v. State,
13 Ga. App. 722, 725, 79 S.E. 919, 921 (1913) (defendant who supplied morphine
properly convicted of manslaughter); State v. Thomas, 118 N.J. Super. 377, 288
A.2d 32 (manslaughter conviction affirmed where defendant sold heroin to the de-
ceased), cert. denied, 60 N.J. 513, 291 A.2d 374 (1972); State v. Warwick, 16 Wash.
App. 205, 555 P.2d 1386 (1976) (manslaughter conviction affirmed where defendant
supplied MDA to the deceased). Because manslaughter (other than misdemeanor-
manslaughter) actually may require more culpability with respect to death than felony-
murder, nothing prevents additional states from charging felony-murder if their mur-
der statutes would permit it in the context of this type of felony.
I California, Minnesota, Nevada, Tennessee, and Virginia have acted under their
traditional felony-murder doctrines. See People v. Cline, 270 Cal. App. 2d 328, 334,
75 Cal. Rptr. 459, 463 (1969) (second degree murder conviction affirmed where
defendant "committed the felony of furnishing a restricted dangerous drug without
a prescription, an act which . . . directly and proximately caus[ed] the death"); State
v. Forsman, 260 N.W.2d 160, 164 (Minn. 1977) (third degree murder conviction
affirmed where supplying heroin was a felony upon or affecting a person which
caused the death); Sheriff of Clark County v. Morris, 659 P.2d 852, 859 (Nev. 1983)
(second degree murder will lie where defendant feloniously furnished chloral hydrate
which immediately and directly caused an overdose death); State v. Randolph, 676
S.W.2d 943, 946 (Tenn. 1984) (sale of heroin is an inherently dangerous felony
punishable as murder when an overdose death results); Heacock v. Commonwealth,
228 Va. 397, 404-05, 323 S.E.2d 90, 94 (1984) (second degree murder conviction
affirmed where defendant's supply of cocaine was an inherently dangerous felony
causally related to the death).
4 Florida law provides that anyone who distributes an opium preparation, which
includes heroin and morphine, is guilty of first degree murder if a death proximately
results from the ingestion of the drug. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04 (West Supp. 1984).
For the text of the Florida statute, see infra note 21. In Martin v. State, 377 So.
2d 706 (Fla. 1979), the defendant was convicted of first degree murder under this
statute because he sold heroin to someone who in turn gave it to the deceased, who
subsequently died because of the drug.
FELONY-MURDER RULE
First, regardless of the felony committed by a drug supplier, the act
of supplying the drug does not legally cause a user's overdose and
death. Second, those courts that use the felony-murder rule violate
the constitutional guarantee of due process of law by failing to prove
the causation element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Finally,
by treating drug suppliers as murderers, and thereby requiring that
they be punished as severely as those who either intend or legally
cause the deaths of others, the courts necessarily impose a dispro-
portionate sentence in violation of the eighth amendment prohibition
of cruel and unusual punishment.
I. THE APPLICATION OF THE FELoNy-MURDER
RULE TO DRUG SuPPLIRS
Blackstone concisely summarized the common-law doctrine of fe-
lony-murder: "If one intends to do another felony, and undesignedly
kills a man, this is also murder. ' ' 5 As this description indicates, felony-
murder is, in effect, a strict-liability crime.6 The state need not prove
the malice aforethought component of ordinary murder7 once it has
shown the defendant's intent to commit the underlying felony." The
5 4 W. BLACKSTONE, CommNTARimEs *200-01.
6 "Liability is strict, in the sense that no inquiry need be made into the culpability
of any of the actors as to the death; their culpability for the underlying felony is
sufficient." P. Low, J. JEFRIES, JR. & R. BoNNm, CRnMn AL LAW 861 (1982).
" "At common law and traditionally in the United States murder is homicide
committed with malice aforethought." R. PERKINS & R. BoycE, CRumNAL LAw (3d
ed. 1982) (citations omitted). Citing a number of cases, Professors Perkins and Boyce
describe actual malice, as opposed to the implied malice of felony-murder, as an
intent to kill or to inflict great bodily injury or a wanton and willful disregard of
unreasonable human risk where there is no justification, excuse or mitigation. Id.
at 57-60; see also United States v. Wharton, 433 F.2d 451, 454 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
("At common law, murder was unlawful homicide done with 'malice aforethought
* . . ., 1')
'The rationale for this aspect of felony-murder has taken two different forms.
Some courts have stated flatly that no mens rea with respect to death is required.
See, e.g., People v. Root, 524 F.2d 195, 198 (9th Cir. 1975) (felony-murder does
not require intent to kill), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1076 (1976); State v. Nowlin, 244
N.W.2d 596, 604 (Iowa 1976) (felony-murder is category of murder not requiring
intent). Other courts have held that malice aforethought may be imputed from the
intent to commit the underlying felony. See, e.g., Ex parle Bates, 461 So. 2d 5, 6-
7 (Ala. 1984) (homicide is "deemed" committed with malice); Shanahan v. United
States, 354 A.2d 524, 526 (D.C. App. 1976) (malice implied from commission of
the underlying felony).
The courts likely will increasingly invoke the mens rea rationale because the
19861
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causation element of ordinary murder, however, remains intact.9
Over the years, the felony-murder rule has been almost universally
condemned. Many commentators have argued that while felony-mur-
der had a certain logic when all felonies were punishable by death,
the rule has no place in a system that recognizes various degrees of
blameworthiness.' 0 Others have questioned the historical origins of
the rule." Still others have complained that the rule's presumption
of intent is obviously a fiction. 2
In spite of these criticisms, forty-one states and the District of
Columbia still adhere to some version of the felony-murder rule."3
"imputation" approach works as a conclusive presumption, which the Supreme Court
has said violates due process. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 523 (1979); see
also Roth & Sundby, The Felony-Murder Rule: A Doctrine at Constitutional Cross-
roads, 70 CORNELL L. REv. 446, 460-71 (1985) (arguing that felony-murder convictions
based on "imputation" are unconstitutional).
9 See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
,o See Roth & Sundby, supra note 8, at 449-50; see also MODEL PENAL CODE §
210.2 commentary at 31 n.74 (Official Draft 1980) (explaining why code drafters
abolished the rule); 3 J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENOLAND
65-76 (1883) (concluding that the rule was a legal fiction the purpose of which was
never truly articulated).
" See, e.g., G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRUMINAL LAW 278-83 (1978) (the rule
represents an inappropriate extension of the doctrine of transferred felonious intent
by English scholars); Recent Development, Criminal Law: Felony-Murder Rule--Fel-
on's Responsibility for Death of Accomplice, 65 CoLum. L. Rv. 1496, 1496 n.2
(1965) (notes the theory that Lord Coke "blundered" in extrapolating a statement
made by Bracton on unlawful killing into a basis for finding murder from the com-
mission of a felony).
12 See, e.g., J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 260 (2d ed. 1960)
(felony-murder "continues to supply an easy rationalization of' untenable judg-
ments"); Recent Development, California Rewrites Felony-Murder Rule, 18 STAN.
L. REv. 690, 690 n.1 (1966) (the rule has "several 'heads' of its own, each willing
to consume one of the accused's defenses by presuming a needed element"); see also
Tarrence v. Commonwealth, 265 S.W.2d 40, 51 (Ky. 1953) (the rule involves an
implication of law "contrary to the real fact of the case as it appears in evidence"),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 899 (1954).
All this is not to say that no one has risen to the rule's defense, just that the
defenders are limited in number. See, e.g., Crump & Crump, In Defense of the
Felony Murder Doctrine, 8 HAXv. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 359, 396 (1985) (the rule serves
the widespread public perception that a felony involving death is a "qualitatively
different crime"); Note, A Survey of Felony Murder, 28 TErnM. L'.Q. 453, 466 (1955)
("[I]f a man through the commission of a crime of violence contributes substantially
to the death of another, there is no injustice in declaring that contribution murder.").
11 For a breakdown of the states that currently have felony-thurder statutes, see
infra notes 14-17. The nine states that have abolished felony-murder have taken
FELONY-MURDER RULE
The circumstances in which the rule applies, however, vary widely.
Many jurisdictions restrict the application of felony-murder to those
felonies specifically enumerated in their statutory versions of the rule. 4
different paths in doing so. Three states have interpreted their statutes, which appear
to require no mens rea with respect to death, to require ordinary culpability regardless
of whether the death occurs within the course of the enumerated felonies. See People
v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 728, 299 N.W.2d 304, 326 (1980) (interpreting MiCH. Co,&P.
LAWS ANN. § 750.316 (1968)); State v. Davis, 305 N.C. 400, 426, 290 S.E.2d 574,
590 (1982) (interpreting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1981)); State v. Doucette, 143 Vt.
573, 582, 470 A.2d 676, 682 (1983) (interpreting VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2301
(Supp. 1985)). Five states have legislatively overturned the rule. See ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 41-1503 (1977) (requiring that the killing be intentional, knowing or with extreme
indifference); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 635, 636 (1979 & Supp. 1984) (requiring
that the killing be at least negligent); HAWAn REv. STAT. § 707-701 (1976) (requiring
that the killing be intentional or knowing); Ky. REV. STAT. § 507.020 (1984) (requiring
that the killing be intentional, knowing or with extreme indifference); Omo REv.
CODE ANN. §§ 2903.01 to .02 (Baldwin 1979 & Supp. 1985) (requiring that the killing
be purposeful). The last state, New Hampshire, has followed the MODEL PENAL CODE,
which adopts a rebuttable presumption of recklessness when someone commits a
felony. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 630:1-b (1974).
4 See ALAsKA STAT. § 11.41.110(a)(3) (1985) (person who causes death of anyone
other than a participant in course of arson, kidnapping, sexual assault, escape, bur-
glary or robbery commits murder in second degree); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-
1105(A)(2) (Supp. 1985) (person who causes death of another in attempting to commit
sexual conduct with a minor, sexual assault, child molestation, narcotics offenses,
kidnapping, burglary, arson, robbery, escape, or child abuse commits frst degree
murder); CoLo. ],Ev. STAT. § 18-3-102(1)(b) (1978) (person who causes death of
anyone other than a participant in the course of arson, robbery, burglary, kidnapping,
or sexual assault commits first degree murder); CoNN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-54b(6), -54c
(Supp. 1985) (person is guilty of capital felony if he illegally sells cocaine, heroin,
or methadone and a person dies as a direct result of the use thereof, and person
who causes death of anyone other than a participant in the course of robbery, bur-
glary, kidnapping, sexual assault, or escape is guilty of felony-murder); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 22-2401 (1981) (person who kills another in the perpetration of arson, rape,
robbery, mayhem or kidnapping commits first degree murder); IND. CODE ANN. §
35-42-1-1(2) (Burns 1985) (person who kills another while committing arson, burglary,
child molestation, criminal deviate conduct, kidnapping, rape, or robbery commits
murder); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:30.1(2) (West Supp. 1985) (person who kills
another in course of rape, arson, burglary, kidnapping, escape, or robbery commits
second degree murder even though he has no intent to kill or harm); ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 17A, § 202(1) (1983) (person who causes death of another in commission
of murder, robbery, burglary, kidnapping, arson, rape, gross sexual misconduct, or
escape commits felony-murder if the death is a reasonably foreseeable consequence);
Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 97-3-19(1)(c), -27 (1972 & Supp.1985) (person who kills another
while committing rape, burglary, kidnapping, arson, robbery, sexual battery, statutory
rape, or unnatural nonconsensua intercourse commits capital murder, and killings
without malice while person is engaged in any other felony shall be manslaughter);
19861
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Some jurisdictions require that the felony be "inherently danger-
ous."' 5 Other states limit the rule to "forcible" felonies.' 6 Finally,
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-303(2) (1979) (person who kills another in perpetration of
sexual assault, arson, robbery, kidnapping, hijacking, or burglary commits first degree
murder); N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C:11-3(a)(3) (West 1982) (person who causes death of
another in commission of robbery, sexual assault, arson, burglary, kidnapping, or
escape commits murder); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(3) (McKinney Supp. 1985) (per-
son who causes death of one other than a participant in course of robbery, burglary,
kidnapping, arson, rape, sodomy, sexual abuse, or escape commits second degree
murder); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-01(1)(c) (1985) (person who causes death of
another in course of treason, robbery, burglary, kidnapping, felonious restraint, ar-
son, gross sexual imposition, or escape commits murder); OR. REV. STAT. §
163.115(1)(b) (1985) (person who causes death of one other than a participant in
course of arson, criminal mischief, burglary, escape, kidnapping, robbery, any felony
sexual offense, or compelling prostitution commits murder); UTAt CODE ANN. § 76-
5-203 (1)(d) (Supp. 1985) (person who causes the death of anyone other than a
participant in the commission of robbery, rape, sodomy, sexual assault, arson, bur-
glary, or kidnapping commits second degree murder); Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-101(a) (1977)
(person who kills another in commission of sexual assault, arson, robbery, burglary,
escape, resisting arrest, administration of poison, or kidnapping commits first degree
murder).
11 People v. Cline, 270 Cal. App. 2d 328, 330-31, 75 Cal. Rptr. 459, 461 (1969)
(interpreting CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 1970)) (inherently dangerous felonies not
explicitly covered by the first degree murder statute are implicitly covered under the
second degree catchall provision); State v. Lashley, 233 Kan. 620, 632, 664 P.2d
1358, 1369 (1983) (interpreting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3401 (1981)) (to invoke felony-
murder rule, there must be proof homicide was committed in perpetration of felony
inherently dangerous to human life); State v. Harrison, 90 N.M. 439, 442, 564 P.2d
1321, 1324 (1977) (interpreting N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-1(A)(2) (1978)) (of the lesser-
degree felonies, only those inherently dangerous may be used for a conviction of
felony-murder); Wade v. State, 581 P.2d 914, 916 (Okla. Crim. 1978) (interpreting
OLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 708.2 (West 1983)) (to be convicted of felony-murder,
the underlying felony must be inherently or potentially dangerous to human life, as
determined by both the elements of and circumstances surrounding the offense); State
v. Noren, 125 Wis. 2d 204, 208-09, 371 N.W.2d 381, 384 (1985) (interpreting Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 940.02(2) (1984)) (felonies which are inherently or foreseeably dangerous
to human life give rise to felony-murder).
Alabama has included the "inherently dangerous" limitation in the text of its
statute. ALA. CODE § 13A-6-2(a)(3) (1982) (person who causes death of another in
course of felony clearly dangerous to human life commits murder:
"6 See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1(a)(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985) (person who
performs acts which cause death while committing a forcible felony commits murder);
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.185(2)-(3), .19(2) (West Supp. 1986) (person who causes
death of another while committing forcible criminal sexual conduct, robbery, kid-
napping, arson, tampering with a witness or escape commits first degree murder,
and in the course of any other felony of force or violence, the murder is second
degree); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-102(1)(b) (1985) (person who causes death of
another while committing any felony involving the use or threat of physical force
or violence is guilty of murder).
[Vol. 20:671676
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several states still adhere to the common-law rule, which applies to
any felony.'7
After eliminating those jurisdictions that either apply the felony-
murder rule exclusively to code-enumerated felonies which do not
" See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04 (1)(a)(2)-3), .04(4) (Vest Supp. 1984) (person
who kills another in course of drug trafficking, arson, sexual battery, robbery, bur-
glary, escape, child abuse, aircraft piracy, or bombing commits first degree murder,
and person who kills another in course of any other felony commits third degree
murder); O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1(c) (1984) (person who causes death of another in com-
mission of a felony irrespective of malice commits murder): IDAHO CODE § 18-4003
(d),(g) (1979) (murders committed in commission of arson, rape, robbery, burglary,
kidnapping, or mayhem are of first degree, and all other murders are of second
degree); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 707.2(2), .3 (West 1979) (person who kills another
while participating in a forcible felony commits first degree murder, and all other
murders are of second degree); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 410, 411 (1982) (murder
committed in perpetration of rape, sexual offenses, sodomy, mayhem, robbery, bur-
glary kidnapping, storehouse breaking, or daytime housebreaking is of first degree,
and all other murder is of second degree); lAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 265, § I(Vest 1970) (murder committed in commission of a crime punishable by death or
life imprisonment is of first degree, and all other murder is of second degree); NEV.
REv. STAT. §§ 200.010 to .030 (1985) (murder committed in perpetration of sexual
assault, kidnapping, arson, robbery, burglary or sexual molestation, escape or re-
sisting arrest is of first degree, and all other murder, including killings caused by
the sale of a controlled substance to a minor, is second degree); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, §§ 2502(b), (c), (d) (Purdon 1983) (murder committed while engaged in rob-
bery, rape, deviate sexual intercourse by force, arson, burglary, or kidnapping is of
second degree, and all other murder is of third degree); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-10
(Law Co-op. 1985) (murder is the killing of any person with malice aforethought,
either express or implied); S.D. CODIFID LAWS ANN. §§ 22-16-4, -9 (Supp. 1985)
(murder committed in the perpetration of arson, rape, robbery, burglary, kidnapping,
or unlawful use of a destructive device or explosive is of the first degree, and all
other murder is of second degree); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-202(a), -211(a), (b)
(1982 & Supp. 1985) (murder committed in perpetration of arson, rape, robbery,
burglary, larceny, kidnapping, aircraft piracy, or unlawful use of an explosive is of
first degree, and all other murder, including deaths proximately caused by drugs
illegally supplied, is of second degree); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(a)(3) (Vernon
1974) (person who commits a clearly dangerous act that causes death of another in
course of a felony commits first degree murder); VA. CODE §§ 18.2-32, -33 (1982)
(murder in the commission of arson, rape, forcible sodomy, inanimate object sexual
penetration, robbery, burglary, or abduction is of the first degzee, and a killing in
the perpetration of any other felony is second degree); VAsH. REv. CODE ANN. §§
9A.32.030(l)(c), 9A.32.050 (1977) (person who causes death of another in course of
robbery, rape, burglary, arson, or kidnapping commits first degree murder, and one
who causes death in commission of any other felony commits second degree murder);
W. VA. CODE § 61-2-1 (1984) (murder committed in course of arson, rape, burglary,
or robbery is of first degree and all other murder is of second degree).
1986]
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include drug sales' 8 or forcible felonies,' 9 which would seem not to
include drug sales, there are twenty-three jurisdictions that could pros-
ecute a drug supplier for felony-murder should an overdose occur. 0
Five of these jurisdictions have enacted statutes which expressly pro-
vide that a drug supplier is guilty of murder if the person to whom
he supplied the illegal drug dies of an overdose. 2' The remaining eight-
een jurisdictions could either classify drug sales as "inherently dan-
gerous" felonies, as does California, 22 or simply apply their statutory
versions of the common-law rule, which do not exclude drug sales
in the definition of felonies giving rise to murder. 23
II. THE ABSENCE OF CAUSATION IN FELONY-MURDER
PROSECUTIONS BASED ON DRUG SALES
In the eighteen jurisdictions that could apply their general felony-
murder rule to the overdose context, and perhaps those jurisdictions
which have statutes expressly addressing drug sales (the requirements
of those recent statutes still being in doubt), the state must prove that
the defendant caused a death.24 Traditionally, this has meant that the
" See supra note 14.
,9 See supra note 16.
" See supra notes 15, 17 and infra note 21.
21 Axuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1105 (Supp. 1985) ("A person commits first degree
murder if [he] commits or attempts to commit . . . narcotics offenses under § 13-
3406 [supplying of dangerous drugs] and in the course of an in furtherance of such
offense... causes the death of any person."); CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-54b(6) (1985)
(person is guilty of a capital felony if convicted of "the illegal sale, for economic
gain, of cocaine, heroin or methadone to a person who dies as a direct result of
the use by him of such cocaine, heroin or methadone"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04
(West Supp. 1984) ("[U]nlawful killing ... which results from the unlawful dis-
tribution of opium..., when such drug is proven to be the proximate cause of the
death of the user, is murder in the first degree and constitutes a capital felony .... );
NEV. REy. STAT. § 200.010 (1985) ("Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being
... caused by a controlled substance which was sold to a minor ... ."); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-2-211(b) (Supp. 1985) ("Death which results from the unlawful
distribution of opium .. ., when such drug is proven to be the proximate cause of
the death of the user shall be deemed at least murder in the second degree.").
22 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
21 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
24 Five states (Alabama, Georgia, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin) expressly
refer to "causing the death of another" in their statutory definitions of felony-murder.
See supra notes 15, 17. Six more states (Iowa, Missouri, New Mexico, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, and Virginia) refer simply to "killing" in their statutes, see supra
[Vol. 20:671
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defendant's act must have been not only the cause-in-fact, but also
the proximate cause of death.2Y The purported findings of causation
in the overdose cases, however, are more a statement on the morality
of drug use than a conclusion of law.2 Although the cases may support
a finding of cause-in-fact, proximate cause does not exist where the
user's voluntary act intervenes and his overdose is unforeseeable.
notes 15, 17, but the definition of "killing" has long embodied a causation re-
quirement. See, e.g., State v. Cheatham, 340 S.W.2d 16, 19 (Mo. 1960) (person is
not criminally responsible for a killing unless his act was the cause of the deceased's
death); State v. Nelson, 65 N.M. 403, 411, 338 P.2d 301, 306 (in a felony-murder
case, the state must show a causal connection between the felony and the homicide),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 877 (1959); see also G. Wm.uAs, TExTmoox or CnNAL LAw
378 (2d ed. 1983) ("[Kiilling means conduct causing death."). Similarly, the courts
of the seven other states (California, Idaho, Maryland, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania,
South Dakota, and West Virginia) which only refer to "murder" in their felony-
murder statutes, see supra notes 15, 17, have held that causation is a required element
of "murder." See, e.g., People v. Sam, 71 Cal. 2d 194, 211, 454 P.2d 700, 710,
77 Cal. Rptr. 804, 814 (1969) (causation is necessary to prove murder); Mumford v.
State, 19 Md. App. 640, 644, 313 A.2d 563, 566 (1974) (to sustain conviction for
felony-murder, there must be direct causal connection between the homicide and the
felony).
In those states with statutes expressly directed to drug sales, it remains unclear
whether a strict causation requirement will be imposed. The statutes, reproduced
supra note 21, seem to be worded precisely to avoid a requirement that the defendant's
sale have caused the overdose; they focus instead on whether the buyer's use of the
illegal drug was the proximate cause of his death. In Martin v. State, 377 So. 2d
706 (Fla. 1979), the only case reported under any of the statutes, the defendant
attacked this ambiguity on vagueness grounds. The Florida court rejected the attack
without discussion, however, and did not resolve the question of whether causation
is required. Id. at 707. Regardless of whether these state legislatures intended to
eliminate the causation requirement, a causation element may still be constitutionally
mandated. See infra notes 84-139 and accompanying text.
5 See infra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
2 The courts consistently fail to engage in any analysis of causation in the overdose
cases. One would not even know that causation was an element of felony-murder
were it not for the courts' summary conclusions that causation is present. See, e.g.,
People v. Wong, 35 Cal. App. 3d 812, 829, 111 Cal. Rptr. 314, 327 (1973) (second
degree murder conviction affirmed where overdose was "direct causal result" of
inherently dangerous felony of supplying heroin); Martin v. State, 377 So. 2d 706,
708 (Fla. 1979) (proper to impose felony-murder liability for the "distribution of
heroin causing death"); Heacock v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 397, 404-05, 323 S.E.2d
90, 94 (1984) (causal relationship sufficient for murder established where defendant
distributed inherently dangerous drug to the victim who took it and subsequently
died); State v. Warwick, 16 Wash. App. 205, 210-11, 555 P.2d 1386, 1390 (1976)
(causation sufficient to establish manslaughter where defendant supplied MDA pow-
der).
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A. Cause-in-Fact
Courts have long agreed that the first task in determining legal
causation is purely factual. 27 While the approach has been given dif-
ferent labels, such as the "theory of condition, ' 28 the sine qua non
test,29 and the "but for" test,30 the inquiry is the same: if the condition
in question (the defendant's act) were removed, would the result be
the same? If so, it cannot be said that the conduct was the cause-
in-fact. 3'
When this test is applied to the overdose cases, causation in fact
arguably is present. Had the defendant not supplied the drug to the
deceased, he would not have overdosed from that particular quantity
of drug. This conclusion overlooks the fact that, in most cases, if the
user does not find drugs in one place, he will locate them in another.32
Even so, as a scientific proposition, it is enough to say that had that
quantity not been available, the user either would not have injected
himself or would have injected himself with a substance that might
not have killed him. 33
27 See J. HALL, B. GEORGE, JR. & R. FORCE, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
146 (3d ed. 1976); R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 7, at 771-74.
Is Ryu, Causation in Criminal Law, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 773, 787-88 (1958).
9 R. PERKINS & R. BOYCE, supra note 7, at 772.
" G. WILLIAMS, supra note 24, at 379-81.
3' The courts most commonly phrase the inquiry as whether the defendant's con-
duct was a cause "but for," or "without," which the death would not have occurred.
See, e.g., State v. Wiley, 144 Ariz. 525, 540, 698 P.2d 1244, 1259 (1985) (defendant's
kidnapping was an act "but for" which the death would not have occurred); People
v. Bowman, 669 P.2d 1369, 1379 (Colo. 1983) (defendant's arson was an act "but
for" which death of firefighter would not have occurred); Commonwealth v. Rhoades,
379 Mass. 810, 825, 401 N.E.2d 342, 351 (1980) (instructions should have required
that defendant's arson was an act "without which" firefighter's death from heart
attack would not have occurred). Professors LaFave and Scott describe cause-in-fact
as follows: "In order that conduct be the actual cause of a particular result it is
almost always sufficient that the result would not have happened in the absence of
the conduct; or putting it another way, that 'but for' the antecedent conduct the
result would not have occurred." W. LAFAvE & A. SCOTT, JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIM-
INAL LAw 249 (1972).
312 At least in urban areas, heroin is relatively easy to obtain. There are certain
blocks where sellers post themselves, and buyers actually shop around among the
sellers for good bargains or especially high quality drugs. See D. WALDORF, CARnERS
IN DOPE 76-77 (1973); Beschner & Brower, The Scene, in LIn WITH HEROIN 21-27
(1985).
11 Because the outcome without the defendant's conduct is impossible to predict,
it really cannot be said that cause-in-fact is not present. Even if it could be assumed
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B. Proximate Cause
More than cause-in-fact, however, is necessary to establish criminal
responsibility. Because a but-for inquiry would affirm causation in
almost every instance, 34 the law has developed a stricter definition of
causation. Usually called "proximate cause," and sometimes just "legal
cause,"135 this concept singles out those events and conditions that are
sufficiently connected to the proscribed result to be identified on both
scientific and moral grounds as the "cause. 3 6 As this description
indicates, the courts have long allowed proximate cause to reflect the
instinct of the community and therefore have shied away from pre-
cisely defining the term. Nonetheless, two limiting principles have
emerged: (1) intervening cause; and (2) foreseeability.3 7
that the user would find drugs elsewhere and that he would overdose from those,
the result would not, strictly speaking, be the same: his death would result from the
ingestion of a "different" drug.
Professor Ryu cites a German case in which a similar argument was rejected. The
defendant was charged with transporting certain people to a Nazi concentration camp,
and he argued unsuccessfully that they would have been taken there in any event
by other people. Ryu, supra note 28, at 787 n.70 (citing S. v. V. (I. Strafsenat),
Jan. 5, 1951, 1 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Strafsachen 22).
34 Professor Williams argues that but-for causation takes us back to Adam and
Eve because without them, defendants would not be here to perform the more im-
mediate causes of deaths. G. Wmu.uas, supra note 24, at 379. Professors Hart and
Honore present an equally illustrative example: when arson is committed, pure but-
for causation would hold the match manufacturer responsible. Hart & Honore, Caus-
ation in Law, 72 LAw Q. REv. 58, 86 (1956).
3S See, e.g., P. Low, J. JEFPRIs & R. BoNNmi, supra note 6, at 845; R. PEmnKs
& R. BOYCE, supra note 7, at 776. Professor Williams invokes yet a third descriptive
label, "imputable cause," for it "indicate[s] the value-judgment involved." G. Wn.-
uMs, supra note 24, at 381-82.
In the legal context, it is said, we are "interested solely in imputing a result
to a criminal conduct." Ryu, supra note 28, at 783. To engage in this imputation,
the courts have essentially sought to justify their findings by reference either to
scientific or physical principles, or to moral principles, whichever fits the context of
the case. See infra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
Professor Hall recognizes this when he writes of the three steps involved in finding
criminal causation: the sine qua non inquiry, the test of effective or substantial
contribution, and the evaluation of mens rea that inevitably occurs, whether explicit
or not. J. HAu, supra note 12, at 282-83. Professor Ryu's conclusion is much the
same. "No evaluation can be sound unless it is based upon scientific grounds," and
yet "[r]esponsibility arising from the establishment of causation in criminal law ranges,
depending upon the nature of the crime involved, from subjective culpability to an
objective symbol of the actor's contribution to the result." Ryu, supra note 28, at
805.
37 The majority of courts clearly recognize that proximate cause is essential to
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Under the intervening cause approach, the court first determines
whether the proscribed result follows in logical order from the defend-
any criminal statute, including felony-murder. See, e.g., State v. Lawson, 144 Ariz.
547, 559, 698 P.2d 1266, 1278 (1985) (felony-murder requires but-for and proximate
causation); State v. Bowman, 669 P.2d 1369, 1379 (Colo. 1983) (absence of proximate
cause is a defense to felony-murder); State v. Wall, 94 N.M. 169, 171-72, 608 P.2d
145, 148 (1980) (proximate cause is an essential element of felony-murder). A minority
of courts, however, have refused to require proximate cause in the felony-murder
context. See, e.g., People v. Gunnerson, 74 Cal. App. 3d 370, 378, 141 Cal. Rptr.
488, 493 (1977) (no strict requirement of causation between a killing and the com-
mission of a felony); State v. Covington, 290 N.C. 313, 327, 226 S.E.2d 629, 639-
40 (1976) (no requirement that underlying felony proximately caused the death). These
courts, however, seem to have confused the "res gestae" concept, which defines the
scope of the felony, with causation.
The res gestae of the felony has been defined as "not only the actual facts of
the transaction and the circumstances surrounding it, but the matters immediately
antecedent to and having a direct causal connection with it, as well as acts immediately
following it and so closely connected with it as to form in reality a part of the
occurrence." State v. Fouquette, 67 Nev. 505, 529, 221 P.2d 404, 417 (1950), cerl.
denied, 341 U.S. 932 (1951). The res gestae doctrine directs the court to ask whether
the conduct of the defendant at the time he caused the death was conduct causally
related to the felony. See, e.g., State v. Hearron, 228 Kan. 693, 695, 619 P.2d 1157,
1159 (1980) (flight from a crime may be considered part of res gestae of the crime
and a killing during flight may constitute felony-murder).
In other words, the doctrine explains what is meant by the typical language of
felony-murder statutes, such as "in the commission of" and "in furtherance of" a
felony. See supra notes 14-17. It does not supplant the causation requirement. Yet
those courts rejecting proximate cause as an element of felony-murder blur the two
requirements and, as a result, satisfy themselves with but-for causation. See, e.g.,
People v. Mitchell, 61 Cal. 2d 353, 361-62, 392 P.2d 526, 531, 38 Cal. Rptr. 726,
731-32 (1964) (proof of strict causal relationship not required, sufficient to show that
felony and homicide were parts of continuous transaction), cert. denied, 384 U.S.
1007 (1966); State v. Schwensen, 237 Or. 506, 516, 392 P.2d 328, 334 (1964) (must
be such legal relation between the killing and the crime that the killing can be said
to have occurred as part of the perpetration or in furtherance of it). This conclusion
is unsound for a number of reasons.
First, it must be remembered that felony-murder, by definition, does away with
any intent requirement. If, in addition, only but-for causation is required, the logical
extreme carries us light-years away from the purpose of the criminal law. Second,
it may well be that the courts concluded that only but-for causation was necessary
on the basis of the famous Pennsylvania third-party cases, since overruled, which
were somewhat difficult to explain under traditional principles ofintervening cause
and foreseeability. For example, in Commonwealth v. Almeida, 362 Pa. 596,
68 A.2d 595 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 924 (1950), the court had held that a
robber was responsible for the shooting death of a second policeman by a first
policeman trying to stop the robbery. Id. at 607, 68 A.2d at 601. In another case,
however, the same court held that a robber could not be held liable for the justifiable
shooting by a policeman of his co-felon. Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486,
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ant's act. For example, when a defendant shoots another person, that
person's death is clearly the direct result of the defendant's gunshot.3 8
If the conduct of others is necessary for the proscribed result to occur,
however, intervening causes are present, and the court must then de-
termine whether the intervening causes are dependent or independent. 9
A dependent intervening cause occurs when the defendant's conduct
induces the intervening cause, and its dependence will render the
defendant liable. 40 An independent intervening cause, on the other
hand, results when the intervening cause was not so induced, and its
independence will relieve the defendant of liability.4'
Under the foreseeability approach, the focus is more on the defend-
ant's culpability. The inquiry is whether a reasonable man could have
foreseen the proscribed result as a natural and probable consequence
of his conduct.42 The consequence must be one of appreciable prob-
510, 137 A.2d 472, 483 (1958). Thus, some courts may have determined that but-
for causation was present in the first case but not in the second, and that reconciling
the cases meant requiring only cause-in-fact. Then, by the time Commonwealth ex
rel. Smith v. Myers, 438 Pa. 218, 237, 261 A.2d 550, 559 (1970), overruled Almeida
and expressly required proximate cause in its two-pronged sense, the lax causation
requirement had become an established part of Pennsylvania's case law. See LAFAvE
& ScoTT, supra note 31, at 265.
Finally, and most importantly, the courts which require only but-for causation
for felony-murder do not explain why the clear majority of statutes embodyinj the
rule use precisely the same phrase, "causes the death of any person," to set forth
the element necessary for both malice murder and felony-murder. See the statutes
cited supra notes 14-17. If indeed the word "causes" has different meanings in the
two contexts, due process and the reasonable doubt standard may be violated with
regard to the whole concept of felony-murder. See infra notes 84-107 and accom-
panying text.
31 Even with direct causes, however, there can be intervening acts of a sort. For
example, after a defendant squeezes the trigger, the mechanical operation of the gun
must follow. Yet we do not commonly think of the gun's operation as an intervening
act. R. PERriNs & R. BOYCE, supra note 7, at 788 (the causal connection is considered
to be "direct for juridical purposes even though many intervening causes might be
recognized by a physicist").,
19 The terms "dependent" and "independent" are used here for clarity, although
the author realizes that dependent causes may also be labelled "concurrent" or
"inefficient," and independent causes "supervening" or "efficient."
See infra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
4' See infra notes 49-50 and accompanying text. One court has described inde-
pendent intervening causes as follows: "If it appears that ... another cause inter-
vened, with which [the defendant] was in no way connected, and but for which death
would not have occurred, such supervening cause is a defense to the charge of hom-
icide." State v. Bowman, 669 P.2d 1369, 1379 (Colo. 1983).
41 See State v. Chambers, 53 Ohio App. 2d 266, 272, 373 N.E.2d 393, 397 (1977)
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ability, or criminal responsibility will not be found. 41
These principles are, of course, not mutually exclusive. Courts have
at times referred to both, and at others just to one.4 Most often,
the theories are used as a check on one another to find causation.
The defendant may induce an intervening cause, though he could not
have foreseen it, or he may foresee a fatal consequence though he
does not induce the intervening cause to occur. 45 In the overdose
context, however, the supplying of the drug is not the proximate cause
of the user's death under either theory.
1. Intervening Cause. The familiar metaphor of a "chain of
causation" 46 helps illustrate why the user's choice to ingest the drug
precludes a finding of legal causation in the overdose cases. In a chain
of events, a dependent intervening cause is an event attached to, or
induced by, the event before it. For example, impulsive acts by victims
in order to escape a danger presented by the defendant are dependent
intervening causes. 7 Suicides to escape pain may also be dependent
(defendant responsible for policeman's shooting of co-felon because he set in motion
"a sequence of events, the foreseeable consequences of which were known or should
have been known to him at the time"); In re Leon, 122 R.I. 548, 555, 410 A.2d
121, 125 (1980) (defendant who set fire responsible for the foreseeable consequence
that the victim died of burns and smoke inhalation).
," McLaughlin, Proximate Cause, 39 HAjv. L. REv. 149, 186 (1925) (first de-
scribing the foreseeability standard as one of "appreciable probability"); see also R.
PERK Ns & R. BOYCE, supra note 7, at 817 (foreseeability does not require that "the
intervention [be] more likely to occur than not; and on the other hand it implies
more than that someone might have imagined it as a theoretical possibility").
Compare Crawford v. State, 252 Ga. 552, 552, 314 S.E.2d 880, 881 (1984)
(intervening cause approach) and People v. Fuller, 91 111. App. 3d 922, 929-30, 415
N.E.2d 502, 507-08 (1980) (foreseeability approach) with State v. Wiley, 144 Ariz.
525, 540, 698 P.2d 1244, 1259 (1985) (discussing intervening cause and foreseeability)
and State v. Chambers, 53 Ohio App. 2d 266, 272, 373 N.E.2d 393, 396-97 (1977)
(discussing intervening cause and foreseeability).
41 For example, it might not have been foreseeable that a woman in terror from
an assault would jump from an upstairs window, but her act was induced by the
defendant's act. See Whiteside v. State, 115 Tex. Crim. 274, 277, 280, 29 S.W.2d
399, 400, 402 (1930). Conversely, although the act of a driver in running over someone
left unconscious in the road may not have been induced by the defendant who left
the person in the road, it certainly was foreseeable. People v. Kibbe, 35 N.Y.2d 407,
413, 362 N.Y.S.2d 848, 851-52, 321 N.E.2d 773, 776 (1974), aff'd sub nom. Hen-
derson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145 (1977).
,6 See Hart & Honore, supra note 34, at 86 (discussing the "chain of causation"
concept).
41 See, e.g., Sanders v. Commonwealth, 244 Ky. 77, 82, 50 S.W.2d 37, 39-40
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causes."
Conversely, independent intervening causes exist when a person's
voluntary, deliberate and unreasonable act follows the defendant's
conduct.49 The dangerous act of one who has the time and ability to
deliberate on his reaction to the defendant's deeds unreasonably breaks
the chain of causation.5 0 Interestingly, none of the courts imposing
felony-murder liability for the supply of drugs alone has truly grappled
with the user's choice to ingest them.5'
Had the courts addressed the user's choice, the conflict between
intervening cause principles and the reality of drug use would have
been apparent. A finding that the user's ingestion is a dependent cause
would require either that the supplier somehow induced his "victim"
to consume the drug, or that, for some other reason, the user's in-
tervening act of ingestion was not voluntary and deliberate, but im-
(1932) (defendant responsible for wife's jump from moving car to escape his threats
with a knife); Letner v. State, 156 Tenn. 68, 76, 299 S.W. 1049, 1052 (1927) (where
boy jumped into river following defendant's gunshots at his boat, his act was a
dependent intervening cause of the drowning of two others); Whiteside v. State, 115
Tex. Crim. 274, 277, 280, 29 S.W.2d 399, 403 (1930) (where wife jumped in terror
from upstairs window to escape her husband's brutal assault, her act was dependent
intervening cause).
41 See, e.g., People v. Lewis, 124 Cal. 551, 559, 57 P. 470, 473 (1899) (victim's
cutting his own throat in despair over mortal wound inflicted by defendant was
dependent intervening cause); Stephenson v. State, 205 Ind. 141, 189, 179 N.E. 633,
650 (1932) (where young woman who had been kidnapped and seriously assaulted
seized an opportunity to take poison, her act was considered a dependent intervening
cause of her death).
49 See, e.g., Hendrickson v. Commonwealth, 85 Ky. 281, 287, 3 S.W. 166, 168
(1887) (conviction reversed because wife's unreasonable flight into freezing weather
after crippled husband's threat should have been considered independent intervening
cause of death); State v. Preslar, 48 N.C. 421, 428 (1856) (wife's unreasonable flight
into freezing weather while husband slept, complicating injuries sustained during
earlier beating, was independent intervening cause of death).
10 One recent, albeit incredible, case suggests that the length of time alone prior
to a victim's voluntary intervening act is not determinative of whether it was deliberate
and unreasonable. See United States v. Guillette, 547 F.2d 743, 749 (2d Cir. 1976)
(deceased who rigged a booby trap to protect himself from the defendant's violent
attempts on his life was in fact murdered by the defendant when the device exploded),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 839 (1977).
5, Only one court, and that one considering a manslaughter conviction, has even
discussed the question: "The act of the user in administering the drug to himself
we consider at most to be a concurrent rather than an independent intervening cause."
State v. Thomas, 118 N.J. Super. 377, 380, 288 A.2d 32, 34 (affirming manslaughter
conviction for supply of heroin), cert. denied, 60 N.J. 513, 291 A.2d 374 (1972).
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pulsive.5 2 While the courts have thus far seemed willing to accept such
propositions at face value," the law should recognize them as myths.
Drug suppliers do not induce users to ingest illegal drugs. Numerous
studies of heroin use indicate that neither occasional users nor addicts
are persuaded or even encouraged by those who make the drug avail-
able to them.14 Those wanting the drug seek the source, not vice
versa.5 5 This pattern is especially true in the overdose cases, for often
the "supplier" has not been a traditional supplier at all, but a friend
either sharing the substance or purchasing it with money given him
by the "victim. '5
6
Moreover, even in the case of addicts, their choice to take the drug
on a given occasion is entirely voluntary and deliberate. 7 For many,
12 See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
" See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 118 N.J. Super. 377, 380, 288 A.2d 32, 34 (the
defendant "must have been aware of an addict's unreasoned craving for the drug"),
cert. denied, 60 N.J. 513, 291 A.2d 374 (1972).
1 A landmark study of juvenile drug use in New York City suggested this con-
clusion as early as 1964. The authors write: "[Plushers in high-use gangs tend to
'lay off' their most vulnerable acquaintances-fellow gang members who have recently
returned from hospitalization or imprisonment. . . ." I. CHEIN, 1). GERARD, R. LEE
& E. ROSENFIELD, THE ROAD TO H 376 (1964) [hereinafter cited as 1. CHEIN]. The
more recent studies have overwhelmingly confirmed, on a broader basis, that the
concept of the predatory pusher is erroneous. See L. HUNT & C. CHAMBERS, THE
HEROIN EPIDEMICS 126 (1976) ("A group of peer users may virtually compel their
initiator to obtain heroin for them."); J. KAPLAN, THE HARDEST DRuo 25, 27 (1983)
("[S]ellers of heroin use considerably less pressure and inducement to market their
wares than do most marketers of automobiles . . . ."); D. WALDORF, CAREERS IN
DOPE 29 (1973) ("Drug sellers do not have to tempt or entice persons to use drugs
.... "); Morris, Not the Cause, Nor the Cure: Self-Image and Control Among Inner-
City Black Male Heroin Users, in LIFE wrrH HEROIN 139 (1985) (the men studied
"seem to be saying that their use of heroin [as a habit] is a matter of choice").
" See supra note 54. One of the most recent studies of heroin use in the major
urban areas reveals that there are simply pockets throughout the cities on which
those seeking heroin converge at certain times of the day. Beschner & Brower, The
Scene, in LuE wITH HEROIN 21-29 (1985) (describing the urban "marketplace" for
drugs and an addict's typical day); see also D. WALDORF, supra note 54, at 29 ("[DJrug
users usually seek out the seller.").
16 See. e.g., People v. Wong, 35 Cal. App. 3d 812, 822, 111 Cal. Rptr. 314, 322
(defendants purchased heroin for the deceased, with her money, and were found to
have feloniously supplied it); Heacock v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 397, 401, 323
S.E.2d 90, 92 (1984) (defendant shared cocaine with a number of people at a party).
17 Indeed, those familiar with heroin use do not agree that even addicts' habits are
involuntary, much less their choice to inject the drugs on a given occasion. "li]t
would be misleading to assume that [addicts] have relinquished control of their lives
to heroin. It would be equally wrong to assume ... that they are filled with self-
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if not most, it is not their physical dependence, but their socio-psy-
chological makeup, that leads them to become regular users.58 A sub-
stantial number are able to successfully hold jobs,9 to control their
cravings long enough to avoid those who sell adulterated drugs,w and
to experience periods of withdrawal voluntarily if their life situation
calls for it.61 Many ultimately go off drugs such as heroin simply by
"maturing out." 62 The suppliers of drugs may be contributing the
means by which users make poor choices, but they are not responsible
for the occasional misfortune that follows a user's voluntary and
deliberate act.
2. Foreseeability. In the overdose cases, the defendants could not
have foreseen the user's death as a natural and probable consequence
of their acts. Although overdose deaths do occur occasionally, they
do not occur with the frequency that would justify a finding that
they are foreseeable. The drug supply scenario is not comparable to
situations where, for example, a felon is held to have foreseen the
death of a policeman at the hands of his armed accomplice. Those
hatred because they use heroin." Morris, supra note 54, at 135. Another account
based on surveys and interviews makes this even clearer: "What most people, profes-
sionals and laymen alike, don't realize about narcotic addicts is that most addicts,
and particularly the young and short-term users, enjoy their experiences with heroin
and wish to continue using it." D. NVA.DoRF, supra note 56, at 66.
-8 "Most [addicts] have stopped for considerable periods more than once." J.
KAPLAN, supra note 54, at 45-46. This statement suggests, and the studies have con-
firmed, that it is more such things as a feeling of association, a calming of frustration
over unrealizable dreams, and the desire to stand out among one's peers that lead
to addiction than it is physical dependence. See I. CHmN, supra note 54, at 6-7
(addressing the distinction between the addictive personality and physical dependence);
J. KAPLAN, supra note 54, at 49-50; D. WALDORF, supra note 54, at 12; Morris,
supra note 54, at 139-42.
59A recent study of black male regular users of heroin in New York, Philadelphia,
Washington, D.C., and Chicago reports that 29.5% are employed and 617o work
legitimate jobs at least from time to time. Walters, "Taking Care of Business"
Updated: A Fresh Look at the Daily Routine of the Heroin User, in LwE wrT
HERoIN 32, 37 (1985). These figures become especially significant when one considers
the traditionally high unemployment rate of young urban black males.
Id. at 39.
61 D. WALDORF, supra note 54, at 130-33; Morris, supra note 54, at 147.
62 "Maturing out" is the phenomenon where an addict decides, without any treat-
ment, that he no longer wants to use the drug regularly or at all. Although the
number has been difficult to monitor precisely because the former addicts did not
seek treatment, it is reported to be substantial. See J.Q. WtLsoN, TmumNo ABOUT
Csim 140 (1975).
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situations, unlike the overdose cases, involve deaths within the range
of appreciable probability.63
The general perception that an overdose is a strong possibility every
time a user ingests an illegal drug such as heroin is not accurate.
The 1984 report of the National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers
Committee65 placed the 1983 heroin addict population at 442,000."
Using the common definition of an addict as someone who injects
at least once daily,67 the number of addict injections in 1983 was well
over 179 million. Of these injections, there were only 632 heroin or
morphine-related deaths, and all of these were not necessarily the
result of an overdose.6s Assuming they were all overdose-related deaths,
63 See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
- See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 68 Misc. 2d 937, 939, 329 N.Y.S.2d 265, 266
(1972) ("[I]t is common knowledge, publicly gleaned in many daily news media
reports, that frequent deaths occur to young persons from the injection of heroin,
[especially] in the larger cities."). Much of the stereotyping is understandable. By
nature, the news media reports unusual events, and the aspect of the drug culture
most likely to garner attention is the overdose, however isolated an event it may be.
The same is true of the film industry, which has inundated the public with sensa-
tionalist movies such as The Hustler, Superfly, The Mack, and Liquid Sky. With
regard to the risk of an injection, however, common sense can supply the answer.
As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has noted: "[A]lthough we recognize heroin is
truly a dangerous drug, we also recognize that the injection of heroin into the body
does not generally cause death. Unfortunately, there are thousands of individuals
who use or abuse heroin daily." Commonwealth v. Bowden, 456 Pa. 278, 284, 309
A.2d 714, 718 (1973).
6 The members of the committee, which has been in existence since 1978, are
representatives of several federal agencies with drug-related law enforcement, foreign
and domestic policy, treatment and research, and intelligence responsibilities. NA-
TIONAL NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE CONSUMERS COMMITTEE, NARcOrics INTELLIONCE
ESTIMATE: THE SUPPLY OF DRUGS TO THE U.S. ILLICIT MARKET FROM FOREION AND
DomEsnc SOURCES IN 1983 (WITH PROJECTIONS THROUGH 1984) ii (1984).
6 Id. at 35. "The addict population remained concentrated in inner-city areas,
and the average age of the addict was over 30 and increasing. Recidivism among
the heroin using population continued." Id.
67 See L. HUNT & C. CHAMBERS, supra note 54, at 118; A. TREBACH, THE HEROIN
SOLUTION 245 (1982); J. KAPLAN, supra note 54, at 34. This definition lends a con-
servative slant to the risk estimate associated with drug use because one daily is the
minimum number of injections an "addict" will take.
61 NNICC, supra note 65, at 35. The death figure is based on data from 24
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas participating in the Drug Abuse Warning
Network, and no indication is given as to whether "heroin/morphine-related deaths"
include hepatitis, malnutrition, or allergic reactions to substances used to "cut" the
drug. See Stimmel, Heroin: A Hazardous Escape from Reality, NY.L.J., Dec. 6,
1971, at 26, col. 5. ("[S]udden death following heroin injection may not be related
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however, the drug user in 1983 had only a .00035(Vo, or 3.5 in a
million, chance of death every time he injected himself.69 If this risk
qualifies as an appreciable probability, it is hard to imagine what risk
would not.
Not only do the courts applying felony-murder in the overdose
context misapprehend the statistical foreseeability of a user's death,
they also ignore the possibility that the user intended to overdose or
ingested an extremely dangerous amount of the drug.70 Courts have
never considered foreseeable a person's act of placing himself at ex-
traordinary risk, 7 yet the overdose cases reflect no recognition that
solely to the heroin but may represent a severe allergic reaction to one of the ad-
ulterants, as well as an additive effect of another abusive drug taken simultane-
ously.").
6 The technique employed here will result in a different figure from year to year,
but the range of risk proves to have been similarly low in the years for which data
is available. According to the NNICC 1981 report, the estimated addict populations
in the years 1977-80 were 495,000, 470,000, 420,000 and 450,000, respectively. NNICC,
NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE FsTiArE, THE SUPPLY OF DRUGS TO THE U.S. MARKET
FRoM FOREIGN AND Domusnc SOURCES IN 1980 (wlnH PROJECTIONS THROUGH 1984)
39 (1981). The heroin-related deaths during that period were reported to be 718, 612,
684 and 852, respectively. Id. at 17. The risks per injection in each of those years,
then, were .000397%, .000356%, .000446%, and .000518%, respectively.
The risk of death from a single use of cocaine is probably even lower than that
for heroin. The NNICC 1981 report estimated that there were at least ten million
people who had used cocaine once in 1980. Id. at 44. During that year there were
96 overdose deaths. Id. at 42. Thus, assuming only three uses in 1980 by each of
those ten million, the risk per use would be less than that for heroin. The problem
with this calculation, however, is that while almost everyone who uses heroin injects
it, cocaine is commonly consumed three different ways: "snorting," smoking, and
injecting. Id. at 42-43. And a recent study has revealed that injection of cocaine
may actually be much more toxic than injection of heroin. Bozarth & Wise, Toxicity
Associated with Long-Term Intravenous Heroin and Cocaine Self-Administration in
the Rat, 254 J. A.M.A. 81 (1985) (testing suggests that cocaine is a much more toxic
compound than heroin when animals are given unlimited access to the drugs intra-
venously).
70 The court's willingness to do so in one case is shocking. Id People v. Cline,
270 Cal. App. 2d 328, 75 Cal. Rptr. 459 (1969), the "victim" ingested fifty-eight
phenobarbitol tablets, yet the court still held the drug supplier liable for the "victim's"
death. Id. at 329, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 460. For an interesting study of the motivation
of deliberate overdose "victims," see James & Hawton, Overdoses: Explanations
and Attitudes in Self-Poisoners and Significant Others, 146 B Ir. J. PSYCHIATRY 481,
483 (1985) (while 41% of those who overdosed stated that their purpose was "to
die," only 307o of those closest to them agreed).
7, See, e.g., Carbo v. State, 4 Ga. App. 583, 583, 62 S.E. 140, 141 (1908) (defend-
ant who created a risk of explosion in a building was held not responsible for the
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extraordinary responses are always possible when a user voluntarily
chooses to ingest an illegal drug.72
Instead, several courts, especially those of California, have sub-
stituted for any accepted foreseeability inquiry a simplistic labelling
of drug sales as "inherently dangerous." 73 Apart from the fallacy of
finding drug sales, as opposed to their consumption, inherently dan-
gerous,74 even the consumption itself is not inherently dangerous.7
Although the lifestyle of an addict is dangerous, as is always the case
when people choose to tempt fate over and over again, the quality
of that lifestyle is not the issue.7 6 The issue is whether the drug supplier
death of one who, fully apprised of the danger, entered the building anyway and
died); accord Regina v. Horsey, 176 Eng. Rep. 129, 131-32 (1862) (defendant arsonist
not liable for death of one who entered building in an apparent suicide attempt).
72 One British court, however, recently recognized this fact in its decision of a
manslaughter case. In Regina v. Dalby, 1982 Crim. L. Rev. 439, the Court of Appeal
quashed the conviction of a defendant who supplied Diconal to the deceased just
before they both injected the substance. The court explained that "[t]he supply did
not cause any direct injury to [the deceased]; it would have caused no harm unless
[he] had subsequently used the drugs in a form and quantity which was dangerous."
Id. at 440.
71 See, e.g., People v. Taylor, 11 Cal. App. 3d 57, 59, 89 Cal. Rptr. 697, 698
(1970) (second degree murder affirmed where defendant committed inherently dan-
gerous felony of furnishing heroin); State v. Randolph, 676 S.W.2d 943, 946 (Tenn.
1984) (second degree murder conviction would stand where defendant committed
inherently dangerous felony of selling heroin); Heacock v. Commonwealth, 228 Va.
397, 404-05, 323 S.E.2d 90, 95 (1984) (second degree murder conviction affirmed
where defendant committed inherently dangerous felony of supplying cocaine). An
"inherently dangerous" felony has been defined as one which poses danger to human
life. See, e.g., People v. Burroughs, 35 Cal. 3d 824, 828, 678 P.2d 894, 899, 201
Cal. Rptr. 319, 321 (1984) (felonious practice of medicine without a license is not
inherently dangerous and will not support second degree felony-murder).
There is a special irony in the courts' willingness to end the inquiry in the overdose
cases at a finding that drug sales are inherently dangerous: the requirement that any
felony be inherently dangerous to warrant felony-murder was intended to be a lim-
itation on a disfavored doctrine. See People v. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d 777, 783,
.402 P.2d 130, 134, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442, 446 (1965) (Traynor, J.) ("Although [felony-
murder] is the law in this state, it should not be extended beyond any rational function
that it is designed to serve.") Yet because the application of the rule will have no
deterrent effect in the overdose cases-the deaths are not foreseeable-the rule is
clearly being extended beyond any rational function that it was designed to serve.
74 Justice Spence of the California Supreme Court unwittingly recognized this when
he wrote: "[Taking a shot of heroin was an act dangerous to human life." People
v. Poindexter, 51 Cal. 2d 142, 149, 330 P.2d 763, 767 (1958) (emphasis added) (holding
defendant liable for supplying heroin to deceased).
'5 See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
76 Note the confusion on this point in Heacock v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 397,
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should have foreseen, on one particular occasion, not only the user's
choice to take the drug, but the theoretical possibility that the user
would overdose.
Several courts outside of California have recognized this fallacy.
The New York and Pennsylvania courts have refused to find the
supply of heroin, without more, the legal cause of an overdose death."
Although the judges in those states evidence great concern over the
supply and use of illegal drugs, they recognize that the theoretical
risk of an overdose does not establish foreseeability." Put simply,
the public's feeling of repulsion for drug dealers is insufficient reason
to ignore or expand beyond recognition the settled principles of legal
causation."
III. THE CONSTrrUTIONAL DEFECTS OF APPLYING
FELONY-MURDER TO THE SUPPLY OF DRUGS
The application of the felony-murder rule in the overdose context
violates the drug suppliers' constitutional rights. First, such an ap-
323 S.E.2d 90 (1984). One of the reasons given by the court for the foreseeability
of the death is that cocaine is classified as a Schedule 2 controlled substance, meaning
it has a 'high potential for abuse' which 'may lead to severe psychic or physical
dependence."' Id. at 404, 323 S.E.2d at 94 (quoting VA. CODE § 54-524 (1982)).
What connection there is between these facts and the foreseeability of death remains
a mystery.
See, e.g., People v. Pinckney, 38 A.D.2d 217, 219, 328 N.Y.S.2d 550, 552
(1972) ("Although it is a matter of common knowledge that the use of heroin can
result in death, it is also a known fact that an injection of heroin into the body
does not generally cause death."), aff'd, 32 N.Y.2d 749, 297 N.E.2d 523, 344 N.Y.S.2d
643 (1973); Commonwealth v. Bowden, 456 Pa. 278, 284, 309 A.2d 714, 718 (1973)
(court "recognize[s] that the injection of heroin into the body does not generally
cause death").
71 One New York court, however, has recognized that facilitating heroin use by
one under the influence of barbiturates may be deemed to cause a death because
the chances of death under such circumstances are substantially increased. See People
v. Cruciani, 44 A.D.2d 684, 685, 353 N.Y.S.2d 811, 813 (1974) (affirming man-
slaughter conviction of defendant who helped administer heroin), aff'd, 36 N.Y.2d
304, 327 N.E.2d 803, 367 N.Y.S.2d 758 (1975).
Judge Shapiro, in People v. Pinckney, 38 A.D.2d 217, 328 N.Y.S.2d 550 (1972)
was especially unimpressed with the prosecutor's arguments that overdose deaths are
foreseeable. As he wrote in his concurring opinion:
Irihe proportion of such deaths to the number of times narcotics are
currently being used by addicts and for legal medical treatment is not
nearly great enough to justify an assumption by a person facilitating the
injection of a narcotic drug by a user that the latter is running a sub-
stantial and unjustifiable risk that death will result from that injection.
Id. at 224, 328 N.Y.S. 2d at 557 (Shapiro, J., concurring).
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plication of the rule infringes upon the drug suppliers' fourteenth
amendment right to due process of law. Due process requires that
the state prove the causation element of felony-murder beyond a rea-
sonable doubt." In the overdose cases, however, the courts are either
failing to insist upon such proof or expanding causation to the point
where the reasonable doubt standard is meaningless."
Second, convicting drug suppliers of felony-murder violates the eighth
amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment because
equating them with murderers ensures that their sentences will be
disproportionate to their actual crime. The Supreme Court has rec-
ognized that the eighth amendment requires courts to look beyond
the labels assigned to offenses for the purpose of sentencing.82 Because
such an inquiry will reveal that the conduct punished in the overdose
cases is nothing more than drug distribution, the sentences imposed
should accord with sentences imposed expressly for that crime.83
A. Avoiding the Reasonable Doubt Standard: The Overdose
Cases and the Requirements of Due Process
In its 1970 decision of In re Winship," the Supreme Court first
announced that due process requires proof beyond reasonable doubt
in every criminal case. The rule had long existed in evidentiary law,
Justice Brennan explained, but the Court found it necessary to raise
it to a constitutional standard "[liest there remain any doubt ' ", of
88 See infra notes 84-102 and accompanying text.
8' See infra notes 106-07 and accompanying text. Although legal causation does
not exist in the overdose cases, it is not possible, as a practical matter, to tell whether
the trial courts are ignoring the requirement of legal cause or simply presenting the
cases to juries in such a fashion that they cannot help but find that legal cause is
present. The reported cases, which are necessarily from the appellate level, seem to
indicate that the latter is the case, meaning that trial judges are allowing juries freedom
to find causation on their own instincts. See supra notes 34-79 and accompanying
text.
82 See infra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
'3 See infra notes 131-39 and accompanying text.
84 397 U.S. 358 (1970). In In re Winship, the petitioner had been charged with
delinquency, which required the state to show that the petitioner committed an act
which, if done by an adult, would constitute a crime. Specifically at issue was whether
the juvenile had stolen $112.00 from a woman's purse. Id. at 360. Under New York
law at that time, the proof of the offense need only be by a preponderance of the
evidence, and in accord with that standard, the hearing judge had expressed his belief
that a preponderance of the evidence warranted his finding of delinquency. Id.
91 Id. at 364.
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its proper role in fortifying the presumption of innocence.8 The stand-
ard was not only to be applied generally, but was required with regard
to "every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which [the defend-
ant] is charged."' '
Five years later, the Court began to clarify what In re Winship
meant by "every fact necessary" to prove the crime. In Mullaney v.
Wilbur,u the petitioner challenged the constitutionality of the Maine
homicide statute, which defined murder as requiring malice afore-
thought but had been interpreted to require that a defendant prove he
did not act in the heat of passion if the offense was to be reduced
from murder to manslaughter.89 Because malice aforethought nec-
essarily included the absence of the heat of passion, the petitioner
argued, the effect of this requirement was to relieve the state of its
burden of proving malice beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Court unanimously agreed. ° Maine had rationalized the shift
of the burden by claiming that the heat of passion issue arose only
after the crime of felonious homicide had been established,9 ' but the
Court found that such "formalism" was inappropriate when the dis-
tinction would result in the vastly different sentences imposed for
murder and manslaughter:
92
- Id. at 363. Justice Brennan wrote: "The standard provides concrete substance
for the presumption of innocence-that bedrock 'axiomatic and elementary' principle
whose 'enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law."'
Id. (quoting Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895)).
Id. at 364.
-421 U.S. 684 (1975). In Mullaney, the petitioner had been convicted of murder
on the basis of his own statement that he attacked the victim in a frenzy after the
victim made a homosexual advance on him. Id. at 685.
- The Maine murder statute subsequently repealed provided: "Whoever unlawfully
kills a human being with malice aforethought, either express or implied, is guilty of
murder and shall be punished by imprisonment for life." ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit.
17, § 2651 (1964). The Maine manslaughter statute provided: "Whoever unlawfully
kills a human being in the heat of passion, on sudden provocation, without express
or implied malice aforethought, ... shall be punished by a fine of not more than
$1000 or by imprisonment for not more than 20 years .... " ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 17, § 2551 (1964). In practice, murder required that the state prove that the
killing was intentional and without legal justification or excuse. The burden then
shifted to the defendant to persuade the factfinder that he acted in the heat of passion
or sudden provocation if the offense was to be reduced to manslaughter. See State
v. Lafferty, 309 A.2d 647, 664-65 (Me. 1973).
-Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 703-04.
9, Id. at 696-97.
- Id. at 697-99. The Court determined that "a State could undermine many of
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The safeguards of due process are not rendered unavail-
able simply because a determination may already have been
reached that would stigmatize the defendant and that might
lead to a significant impairment of personal liberty. The
fact remains that the consequences resulting from a verdict
of murder, as compared with a verdict of manslaughter,
differ significantly. Indeed, when viewed in terms of the
potential difference in restrictions of personal liberty at-
tendant to each conviction, the distinction established by
Maine between murder and manslaughter may be of greater
importance than the difference between guilt or innocence
for many lesser crimes.9
Based on Justice Powell's language above, many lower courts and
commentators concluded that the Court was concerned with the sub-
stance of state crimes such as murder and manslaughter." A year
the interests [In re Winship] sought to protect without effecting any substantive change
in its law" if it were allowed to shift the traditional burdens of proof just by labelling
the offense felonious homicide. Id. at 698. It was therefore more appropriate to look
at the operation and effect of the state law than at the name. Id. at 699.
91 Id. at 698. Justice Powell's discussion could not have described the overdose
cases better. First, there is every reason to believe that it is only because the defendant
is already stigmatized as a "pusher" that the courts worry little over the law of
causation. Second, there is usually a significant difference in the punishments imposed
for drug distribution and murder. On the federal level, for example, the average
violator of the narcotics laws from 1982 to 1983 was sentenced to 63.8 months. 17
AD. OFFcE U.S. CTs. ANN. REP. H-21 (1983). The average person convicted of
murder was sentenced to 151.8 months. Id. at H-15.
94 See Angel, Substantive Due Process And The Criminal Law, 9 Loy. U. CnHI.
L.J. 61, 101 (1977) (reading Mullaney as a substantive decision would require that
states include certain elements in their definitions of crime and not as affirmative
defenses); Tushnet, Constitutional Limitation of Substantive Criminal Law: An Ex-
amination of the Meaning of Mullaney v. Wilbur, 55 B.U.L. REv. 775, 780 (1975)
(asking why, if the Court were conducting a solely procedural review, was the Maine
statute not upheld as creating a permissive presumption); Note, Burdens of Persuasion
in Criminal Proceedings: The Reasonable Doubt Standard After Patterson v. New
York, 31 U. FLA. L. REv. 385, 400 (1979) (Mullaney's lengthy discussion of the
historical requirements of murder and the role of the heat of passion seemed out
of place if the decision were to be read as solely procedural); see also Low & Jeffries,
Dicta: Constitutiotializing the Criminal Law?, Va. L. Wkly., UMar. 25, 1977, at 1,
3 (reading Mullaney as a substantive decision admits that the reasonable doubt stan-
dard limits state power to draw and interpret homicide statutes, and presumably statutes
defining other crimes as well); Comment, Affirmative Defenses in Ohio After Mul-
laney v. Wilbur, 36 Omo ST. L.J. 828, 835 (1975) (Mullaney clarifies that In re
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later, however, in Patterson v. New York,9 a majority of the Court
insisted that a substantive interpretation of Mullaney was incorrect.9
Although many commentators have described Patterson as a case in-
volving a scheme identical to that struck down in Mullaney,97 the
Court found that the state had not unconstitutionally displaced its
burden of proof.98
In Patterson, the Court addressed a challenge to New York's murder
statute, which required that "intent," rather than "malice aforeth-
ought," be proven beyond a reasonable doubt and labelled "emotional
disturbance" an affirmative defense. 99 Beginning its opinion with the
Winship's requirement that state prove necessary "facts" actually means that the
substance of a crime must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt).
The state courts, however, were split as to whether Mullaney was a substantive
decision. Compare People v. Long, 83 Misc. 2d 14, 18, 372 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390-92
(Sup. Ct. 1975) (Mullaney does not bar assigning the burden of proof of entrapment
to the defendant) and State v. Williams, 288 N.C. 680, 691, 220 S.E.2d 558, 566
(1975) (nothing in Mullaney indicates that a presumption of malice arising from the
defendant's proximate causation of a death is unconstitutional) with Evans v. State,
28 Md. App. 640, 731, 349 A.2d 300, 345 (1975) (Mullaney does away with affirmative
defenses generally, whether they involve mitigation or excuse), affd, 278 Md. 197,
362 A.2d 629 (1976) and People v. Balogun, 82 Misc. 2d 907, 911, 372 N.Y.S.2d
384, 387-88 (Sup. Ct. 1975) (murder statute unconstitutional because Mullaney re-
quires that state prove absence of emotional disturbance as part of intent to kill).
432 U.S. 197 (1977). In Patterson, the petitioner had been convicted of second
degree murder after he went to his father-in-law's house, found his estranged wife
in a state of semi-undress in the company of another man, and shot the other man
twice in the head. Id. at 198.
', Id. at 214-16. Justice White wrote for the majority:
Mullaney's holding, it is argued, is that the State may not permit the
blameworthiness of an act or the severity of the punishment authorized
for its commission to depend on the presence or absence of an identified
fact without assuming the burden of proving the presence or absence of
that fact, as the case may be, beyond a reasonable doubt. In our view,
the Mullaney holding should not be so broadly read.
Id. at 214-15.
- See, e.g., id. at 222 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("IThe effect on the defendant
of New York's placement of the burden of persuasion is exactly the same as Maine's.");
Note, Voluntary Manslaughter After Patterson: An Analysis of Ohio Law, 33 C.v.
ST. L. REv. 513, 531 (1984-85) (by ignoring fact that the statutes involved in Patterson
and Mullaney operated the same way, Patterson seemed to be encouraging the clever
statutory craftmanship it expressly prohibited). Indeed, a lower New York court which
played no role in the Patterson case saw Mullaney as necessarily rendering the New
York scheme unconstitutional. See People v. Balogun, 82 Misc. 2d 907, 911, 372
N.Y.S.2d 384, 387-88 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
91 Patterson, 432 U.S. at 207.
91 The statute provided specifically:
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statement that "preventing and dealing with crime is much more the
business of the States than it is of the Federal Government,"'' 1 the
Court concluded that the New York legislature's use of the word
"intent" indicated that it had not intended to include lack of emo-
tional disturbance in its definition of murder. 10 Because the New York
court had adhered to the state's definition of murder, which only
required proof of intent, Patterson's murder conviction could stand.0 2
In the wake of Patterson, many commentators insisted that the
decision effectively overruled Mullaney by focusing on formal defi-
nitions rather than on the blameworthiness and culpability at the heart
of the Mullaney holding. 03 The overdose cases, however, present a
A person is guilty of murder in the second degree when:
1. With intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the
death of such person or of a third person; except that in any prosecution
under this subdivision, it is an affirmative defense that:
(a) The defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional
disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse,
the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint
of a person in the defendant's situation- under the circumstances as
the defendant believed them to be. Nothing contained in this paragraph
shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction
of, manslaughter ....
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (McKinney 1975).
100 Patterson, 432 U.S. at 201 (citing Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 134 (1954)
(plurality opinion)).
,0, Id. at 209. The Patterson majority apparently did not feel that intent and
emotional disturbance were mutually exclusive: "To recognize at all a mitigating
circumstance does not require the State to prove its nonexistence in each case in
which the fact is put in issue. . . ." Id. Maine's statute in Mullaney was distin-
guishable, the Court held, because findings of both malice and heat of passion were
contradictory; thus, the effect of the burden shift had been to presume malice. Id.
at 214-15.
02 Id. at 205. The effect of the holding, then, was that due process required a
look no further than the state's definition of a crime for facts which the state must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court also took pains to say that the reasonable
doubt standard and affirmative defenses had existed side by side for quite some time
and had not "le[d] to such abuses or to such widespread redefinition of crime and
reduction of the prosecution's burden that a new constitutional rule was required."
Id. at 211. At the same time, however, the Court's rather cryptic remark that "there
are obviously constitutional limits beyond which the States may not go in this regard"
seemed to reserve to it some say in what the states could deem criminal. Id. at 210.
10 See, e.g., Dutile, The Burden of Proof in Criminal Cases: A Comment on the
Mullaney-Patterson Doctrine, 55 NoTR DAME LAW. 380, 382-83 (1979); Roth &
Sundby, supra note 8, at 463; Note, supra note 95, at 405. Dutile's illustration of
Patterson's logical extreme is striking. He suggests that without the blameworthiness
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context in which the Patterson and Mullaney decisions can be rec-
onciled. From Patterson comes the principle that as long as a state
includes a certain element in its definition of an offense, that element
must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt1 °M In the overdose cases,
this means that causation must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt,
for at least five of the six jurisdictions that have found drug suppliers
guilty of felony-murder have treated causation as an essential element
of the offense.105
From Mullaney comes the principle that a state cannot alter an
element of an offense in a given situation simply because a threshold
level of culpability has been found; to do so circumvents the rea-
sonable doubt standard in violation of the fourteenth amendment
guarantee of due process.30 Yet this is precisely what the courts con-
victing drug suppliers of felony-murder are doing. Aware that caus-
ation, an essential element of felony-murder, must be proven beyond
a reasonable doubt, these courts depart from traditional legal prin-
ciples of intervening cause and foreseeability and find causation simply
because the drug supplier committed a felony.1'° This "formalism,"
focus of Mullaney, the following statute would pass constitutional muster under
Patterson:
§ 1: Whoever is present in any private or public place is guilty of a
felony punishable by up to 5 years imprisonment.
§ 2: It shall be an affirmative defense for the defendant to prove, to a
preponderance of the evidence, that he was not robbing a bank.
Dutile, supra, at 383. Although this example seems incredible, there is nothing in
Patterson to suggest that the Court would interfere other than its mysterious remark
that there are "obviously constitutional limits beyond which the States may not go."
Patterson, 432 U.S. at 210.
-0 See supra notes 95-102 and accompanying text.
105 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. With respect to the sixth jurisdiction,
Florida, it remains unclear whether or not causation is regarded as an element of
the offense because the statute under which felony-murder has been applied is so
new, and the only decision thus far interpreting it is ambiguous in that regard. See
supra note 24.
- See supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text. The Mullaney Court made clear
its focus on circumvention of the standard when it recognized: "On rare occasions
the Court has re-examined a state-court interpretation of state law when it appears
to be an 'obvious subterfuge to evade consideration of a federal issue.' " 421 U.S.
at 691 n.ll (quoting Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 129 (1945)).
Although the court did not invoke the "obvious subterfuge" line of cases directly
in Mullaney, for the Maine statute did not appear intended to frustrate due process,
id., the reference itself suggests that the Mullaney holding was based on an incidental
frustration of the reasonable doubt standard.
,07 See supra notes 34-79 and accompanying text.
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permitting causation to be an entirely discretionary concept that
may Vary from case to case, is incompatible with Mullaney's inter-
pretation of due process.
B. Equating Drug Suppliers with Murderers: A Cruel and
Unusual Comparison
Those courts which deem.drug suppliers murderers, whether they
base the convictions on an expanded concept of legal causation or
fail altogether to require causation,' 8 also violate the suppliers'
eighth amendment rights."0 9 Although it appeared for many years
that the Supreme Court would limit the eighth amendment prohi-
bition to only cruel and unusual forms of punishment, the Court
held in 1983 that a disproportionate prison sentence alone could
violate the eighth amendment. II In Solem v. Helm,II' Justice Powell
wrote for the majority: "[c]ourts are competent to judge the gravity
of an offense, at least on a relative scale.""' 2 When this evaluation
101 See supra note 81.
,09 The eighth amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST.
amend. VIII. In one of the earliest eighth amendment cases, cruel and unusual
punishments were described as those "which by their excessive length or severity
are greatly disproportioned to the offenses charged." Weems v. United States,
217 U.S. 349, 371 (1910) (quoting O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 340 (1892)
(Field, J., dissenting)).
11o See infra notes 111-32 and accompanying text.
463 U.S. 277 (1983).
112 Id. at 292. Most of the earlier eighth amendment cases relied upon by the
Solem Court to justify its proportionality review involved the death penalty or
factors in addition to excessive sentences which rendered them cruel and unusual.
See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (arbitrary imposition of death
penalty unconstitutional); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (sentence
of ninety days for the "crime" of narcotics addiction alone unconstitutional);
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910) (sentence of fifteen years of hard
labor in chains unconstitutional).
Several cases prior to Solem had, however, indicated that, in a proper case, the
disproportionality of a sentence could cause it to be vacated. See, e.g., Hutto v.
Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 374 & n.3 (1982) (per curiam) (recognizing that some prison
sentences may be unconstitutionally disproportionate); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S.
263, 274 n.11 (1980) (same). In Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), the Court
had enunciated a test which, although the case involved the death penalty, swept
broadly; punishment is unconstitutional if "it (1) makes no measurable contribu-
tion to acceptable goals of punishment and hence is nothing more than the pur-
poseless and needless imposition of pain and suffering; or (2) is grossly out of
proportion to the severity of the crime." Id. at 592.
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is undertaken in the overdose cases, any sentence treating the drug
suppliers as murderers emerges as cruel and unusual." 3
In Solem, the Court determined that a sentence of life imprisonment
without parole imposed solely on the fact of recidivism constituted
cruel and unusual punishment."' To reach its result, the Court cited
several earlier cases in which the seriousness of a crime had been
evaluated. In Robinson v. California,"5 for example, the Court had
determined that drug addiction was a mere status that warranted no
criminal sanctions whatsoever. '" 6 Likewise, the Court in Enmund v.
Florida"7 had found that the death penalty could not be imposed
where a defendant convicted of felony-murder had not actually killed,
attempted to kill, or intended to kill. ' 8 In these and the other cases
cited," 9 the Solem majority observed, the Court had been able to
113 See infra notes 131-39 and accompanying text.
"" Solem, 463 U.S. at 303. Jerry Helm, the petitioner in Solem, had been
convicted of seven felonies. Three of the convictions were for third degree bur-
glary, one was for obtaining money under false pretenses, one was for grand
larceny, one was for driving while intoxicated, and the final conviction was for
uttering a "no account" $100 check. Id. at 279-81. Although, as the Court pointed
out, he would have been sentenced at most to five years and S5000 for the last
crime standing alone, Helm was given life imprisonment without parole under
three South Dakota statutes. Id.
M' 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
116 Id. at 665-67. The Robinson Court found that drug addiction was an illness
which, without more, should not give rise to criminal sanctions. Justice Stewart
wrote for the majority: "Even one day in prison would be a cruel and unusual
punishment for the 'crime' of having a common cold." Id. at 667. As this
indicates, Robinson is one of those rare instances in which the Court has em-
ployed the Constitution to reach the states' substantive definitions of crime.
458 U.S. 782 (1982).
,5 Id. at 788. Petitioner, Earl Enmund, had been convicted of first degree
felony-murder and sentenced to death on the theory that he had waited in a car
as two others robbed and shot an elderly Florida couple. The Court found that
only eight jurisdictions would impose the death penalty solely because the defend-
ant somehow participated in a robbery in the course of which a murder was
committed, id. at 792, and further that since 1954 there were only six cases out
of 362 where a nontriggerman felony-murderer was executed. Id. at 794. On the
basis of statistics such as these, the Court concluded that the death penalty was
cruel and unusual in Enmund's case. Recently, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
principles of Enmund. See Cabana v. Bullock, 106 S. Ct. 689, 693 (1986).
,19 In addition to the cases cited within the text, Solem cited Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349, 363, 365 (1910) (defendant's crime had been falsification of
a public document, and the Court found that the petty offense did not warrant
fifteen years of cadena temporal, or hard labor in chains) and Coker v. Georgia,
433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977) (Court compared rape to murder, and concluded that
only the latter warranted the death penalty). Solem, 463 U.S. at 291.
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evaluate the harshness of the penalty vis-a-vis the gravity of the offense
involved, 20
The Solem Court suggested several criteria that should guide such
an vauation, First, the sentencing courts should focus on the gravity
of the offense.'2' The labels assigned to the offense, however, are not
conclusive, 22 Instead, the courts should, among other things, deter-
mine whether the acts giving rise to the conviction involved violence
or the threat of violence,12 and whether the defendant committed the
crime maliciously, intentionally, recklessly or negligently. 2 4 In Jerry
Helm's case, the Court found that the prior acts leading to his re-
cidivism conviction were "relatively minor" because they were all non-
violent property crimes. 1 5
Second, the sentencing courts should evaluate the harshness of the
penalty. 26 To determine the harshness, the Solem Court instructed
the lower courts to focus on the penalties imposed for other crimes
in the same jurisdiction, 27 and the penalties imposed for the same
crime in other jurisdictions, 28 The Court found that Helm's punish-
12 Solem, 463 U.S. at 292.
M Id. at 290-91.
'2 The Solem Court acknowledged Helm's habitual offender status as a concept
distinct from each of his offenses, but it focused on the acts Helm had committed
to become an habitual offender. Id. at 296-97. This inquiry "be.yond the labels"
corresponded with the analysis employed in Enmund, where the Court evaluated the
degree of Enmund's participation rather than simply accept Florida's conclusion that
he was a "felony-murderer," Enmuind, 458 U.S. at 797-99. Similarly, in Robinson,
the Court had concentrated on what the criminal label of "addiction" actually meant.
Robinson, 370 U.S. at 667.
12, Solem, 463 U.S, at 292,93.
,2 Id, at 293, The two criteria noted in the text, much like the longer list suggested
in Solem, are "by no means exhaustive." Id. at 294. The list in the text is limited
because the other criteria suggested by Solem (the magnitude in property value and
the lesser included offense, attempt, and complicity distinctions) are not applicable
in the overdose felony-murder concept.
I's Id, at 296-97,
226 Id. at 291.
127 Id.
I's Id. In Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984), decided seven months after Solem,
the Court clarified that the eighth amendment does not require states to compare
the sentences imposed for the same crime in the same jurisdiction. The Court ac-
knowledged that some of its language in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972),
and Gregg v, Georgia, 428 U,S, 153 (1976), both involving the death penalty, may
have led the lower courts to conclude that an intrajurisdictional proportionality review
was required, but the Court found such an interpretation incorrect. An intrajuris-
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ment of life imprisonment without parole was cruel and unusual in
both respects. His sentence was disproportionate under the first prong
because he was treated the same as those persons who had committed
murder, second or third offense treason, first degree manslaughter,
first degree arson, or kidnapping.2 His sentence was disproportionate
under the second prong because forty-eight of the fifty states would
not have punished him so severely.'30
When a Solem analysis is applied to the overdose cases, it becomes
clear that the drug suppliers, while they might be seriously punished,
should not be punished as severely as murderers. In sharp contrast
to the act of the ordinary murderer, the act of the drug supplier is
not violent.' 31 The transaction is at most a commercial one. 3 2 Al-
dictional review, the Pulley majority held, was but one of the ways a state could
ensure that the death penalty was not being arbitrarily and capriciously imposed.
Pulley, 465 U.S. at 44-46.
Interestingly, if the type of intrajurisdictional review rejected in Pulley were un-
dertaken in the overdose cases, the results would reveal one of two flaws in these
prosecutions. On the one hand, if drug suppliers whose products lead to death are
not regularly being punished as murderers, then there is a problem of selective pros-
ecution. On the other hand, if indeed there are not enough similarly situated defend-
ants to establish selective prosecution, the government's insistence on the foreseeability
of overdose deaths appears all the more questionable.
'1 Solem, 463 U.S. at 298.
'30 Id. at 299. Before proceeding with the application of Solem in the overdose
context, it should be acknowledged that Justice Brennan devoted several paragraphs
of the Solem opinion to the fact that Helms was ineligible for parole. The discussion
was included primarily to refute South Dakota's argument that Helms' sentence was
virtually the same as the recidivist's life sentence found constitutional in Rummel v.
Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980), just three years earlier. Justice Brennan distinguished
the Rummel decision on the ground that Rummel was eligible for parole after only
ten years. Solem, 463 U.S. at 300-02.
The distinction was indeed a fine one, but the lower courts have not limited Solem's
application to its narrow facts. It is true that they have rarely found eighth amendment
violations, but they have regularly undertaken a Solem analysis in a number of
different contexts. See, e.g., Rhoden v. Israel, 574 F. Supp. 61, 65 (E.D. Wis. 1983)
(17-year sentence for armed robbery not disproportionate under Solem); State v.
Hankins, 686 P.2d 740, 746-47 (Ariz. 1984) (life sentence without parole for at least
twenty-five years for felony-murder based on aggravated assault not disproportionate
under Solem); Commonwealth v. Marcus, 16 Mass. App. 698, 701-03, 454 N.E.2d
1277, 1278-80 (1983) (mandatory five-year sentence imposed on recidivist heroin seller
not disproportionate under Solem).
M' See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
"1 One of the most prominent examples of this can be found in People v. Wong,
35 Cal. App. 3d 812, 111 Cal. Rptr. 314 (1973). In Wong, the defendants were
convicted and sentenced for murder because they bought heroin for the deceased
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though a death eventually occurs, the user chooses to ingest the drug
voluntarily.
Similarly, it cannot be said that the overdose defendants bear the
same culpability as the ordinary murderer, or even the ordinary felony-
murderer. For example, in one overdose case, the defendant supplied
cocaine to a number of people at a party at which he also injected
himself. 33 In another case, the defendant warned the user to reduce
his dose because the defendant had not yet diluted the heroin. 3 4 The
culpability characteristic of someone who deliberately shoots another
person, or even of someone whose co-felon shoots another person
during an armed robbery, cannot be ascribed to these suppliers of
drugs. 3 5 If anything, the evidence in the overdose cases is contrary
to any finding of intent or recklessness with respect to the taking of
human life. 36
with her money. Prior to the overdose, the defendants slept with her and a girl-
friend in a hotel room, and it was the defendants who summoned the authorities
for assistance. See Wong, 35 Cal. App. 3d at 821, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 321.
Even in those cases where a defendant has benefited financially, there is nothing
whatsoever to indicate that the exchange was violent. See, e.g., Martin v, State, 377
So. 2d 706 (Fla. 1979) (first degree murder conviction affirmed where defendant sold
heroin through intermediary to someone he did not even know). To the extent that
the courts are deeming drug transactions violent in some abstract sense, they are,
again, relying on popular myth. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
"I Heacock v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 397, 401, 328 S.E.2d 90, 92 (1984).
,14 State v. Randolph, 676 S.W.2d 943, 944 (Tenn. 1984).
"I In these situations, or even in situations where a defendant's gun misfires as
he waves it about, it can be argued that the defendant has exhibited recklessness
with respect to a potential death. When a defendant has accompanied someone car-
rying a gun, there is a somewhat natural presumption that his co-felon will use it
if necessary to preserve his own life. See Adlerstein, Felony-Murder in the New
Criminal Codes, 4 AM. J. CRiw. L. 249, 250 (1975-76) (felony-murder rule encourages
felons to dissuade co-felons from intentional killing). The response of a resister who
accidentally kills, for example, a hostage, can also arguably be foreseen. See Pizano
v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 128, 577 P.2d 659, 145 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1978) (defendant
properly convicted of murder where his co-felon took a hostage at gunpoint and a
neighbor shot and killed the hostage). Similarly, guns misfire often enough that the
use of them to commit felonies creates an inordinate risk of someone being shot.
See Fletcher, Reflections on Felony-Murder, 12 Sw. U. L. Rsv. 413, 425 (1981)
(suggesting that the rationale has been that reckless homicide is implicit in the proof
of the underlying felony). In contrast, the drug "suppliers" are often friends who
share the drug or dealers who often direct the users on a proper dose. See supra
note 56 and accompanying text.
136 Common sense alone should suggest this conclusion: why would a supplier of
drugs intentionally kill or even behave recklessly with respect to a user's death when
apparently all he wants is his customer's return?
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In truth, the overdose defendants have committed nothing more
than a non-violent act of drug distribution which reflects no culpability
with respect to the users' deaths. Under Solem, then, their sentences
should be in a range less than the penalties imposed by the same
jurisdiction for violent, culpable killings and equivalent to the pen-
alties imposed by other jurisdictions for the offense of distribution. 37
This type of sentencing is not employed when the felony-murder rule
is applied to drug suppliers. When the overdose defendants are sen-
tenced as murderers, they are treated identically to others in their
own jurisdiction who have intentionally and violently killed another
human being, 38 and much more harshly than drug suppliers in other
jurisdictions who will neither be treated nor sentenced as harshly as
murderers. 13
9
137 See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
138 Admittedly, the author has not undertaken an in-depth study of whether the
same courts that fictionally find causation in the overdose cases then flip-flop on
the issue and treat the lack of proximate cause as a mitigating circumstance calling
for the minimum sentences imposed for murder. Even such a study, however, would
not remedy the eighth amendment problem because Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37
(1984), narrowed the required intrajurisdictional proportionality review to sentences
imposed for other crimes. See supra note 128. Thus, the eighth amendment question
cannot be resolved until the defendants in the overdose cases are no longer equated
with murderers.
Judge Posner, writing for the court in United States v. Ambrose, 740 F.2d 505
(7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 3479 (1985), recognized this very idea when
he wrote that sentencing ten defendants who aided and abetted the kingpins of a
major Chicago narcotics enterprise on a par with the kingpins posed serious eighth
amendment concerns under Solem. Id. at 510. Although the case was remanded
because the court believed that the sentences did not comport with congressional
intent, the court recognized that situations were certain to arise where the difference
between a principal's and accomplice's culpability constitutionally required that they
be given different sentences. Id.
139 An extensive review of the states' sentencing provisions with respect to drug
distribution is beyond the scope of this Note, although the vast difference in the
average sentences for distributors and murderers on the federal level is set forth supra
note 93. Moreover, to the extent that some states have imposed mandatory life
sentences for drug distribution, any comparison with those sentences is questionable
because those sentences themselves may be unconstitutional under a Solem analysis
of the gravity of the offense. For example, some of the sentences for drug distribution
which were upheld prior to Solem truly shock the conscience. See, e.g., Castillo v.
Harris, 491 F. Supp. 33 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 646 F.2d 559 (2d Cir. 1980) (mandatory
life sentence with minimum of 15 years to serve for single sale of cocaine not un-
constitutional); People v. Keller, 245 Cal. App. 2d 711, 54 Cal. Rptr. 154 (1966)
(statutorily required life sentence for two sales of marijuana not unconstitutional);
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CONCLUSION
Felony-murder convictions in the overdose cases reflect society's
frustration over its inability to convince those who use drugs such as
heroin or cocaine not to do so. By threatening the suppliers with
murder convictions, the reasoning seems to go, the supply, and con-
sequently the use, will decrease. 140 The fallacy in this reasoning, how-
ever, is that the suppliers likely will not be deterred, for they, unlike
those who convict them, know that the chances of an overdose are
much lower than generally perceived.' 4' The overdose cases conse-
quently advance no principle other than revenge, or a vindication of
the user's death. This principle, standing alone, does not justify the
courts' application of the felony-murder rule if they must distort the
law of causation, violate due process, and impose cruel and unusual
punishment to do so.
Lynne H. Rambo
State v. Mitchell, 563 S.W.2d 18 (Mo. 1978) (statutorily required sentence of 7 years
for $5 sale of 11 grams of marijuana by one with no history of violent crime not
unconstitutional). In contrast, now that Solem has given meaning to the eighth amend-
ment, the courts are beginning to punish certain acts for what they actually are. See,
e.g., United States v. Lewis, 759 F.2d 1316, 1335 (Sth Cir.) (although constrained
by pre-Solem case law and necessary deference to the legislature to uphold life without
parole for running a major cocaine and marijuana distributorship, the court suggests
that the district court reconsider the severity of the sentence), cert. denied, 106 S.
Ct. 406 (1985); Whitmore v. Maggio, 742 F.2d 230, 233-34 (5th Cir. 1984) (case
remanded for Solem evaluation of the offense where total of 125 years without parole
imposed for -two armed robberies).
,,0 See, e.g., People v. Taylor, 11 Cal. App. 3d 57, 63, 89 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701
(1970) '("IK]nowledge that the death of a person to whom heroin is furnished may
result in a conviction for murder should have some effect on the defendant's readiness
to do the furnishing.").
142 See supra notes 64-7.2 and accompanying text. Significantly, the Supreme Court
was unimpressed with a deterrence rationale even for felony-murder based on robbery.
In Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982), the Court noted that the percentage of
robberies accompanied by homicide has been quite low and quite consistent over the
years, not -exceeding .6°7o. Id. 'at 799 (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 comment
at 38 n.96). In the overdose cases, the risk of death accompanying the sale of drugs
is approximately .00035%. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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